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Judicial Control Over the Bar Versus Legislative
Regulation of Governmental Ethics:
The Pennsylvania Approach and a
Proposed Alternative
Stephen J. Shapiro*
I.

INTRODUCTION -THE CLASH BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA
ETHICS LAW AND SUPREME COURT CONTROL OF THE BAR

In a recent series of opinions, Pennsylvania courts have held
two sections of the Pennsylvania Ethics Act (Act)' unconstitutional as applied to judges and attorneys. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court struck down the post-employment restriction of
the Act' as applied to a former judge in Wajert v. State Ethics
Commission.' The restriction was found to be an improper usurpation of the exclusive power of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to regulate the practice of law.' The Pennsylvania Com*Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law.
B.A., Haverford College (1971); J.D., University of Pennsylvania College of Law
(1976). Professor Shapiro served as counsel to the Ohio Ethics Commission from
1977 to 1979.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 401-413 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 403(e) (Purdon Supp. 1981) provides: "No
former official or public employee shall represent a person, with or without
compensation, on any matter before the governmental body with which he has
been associated for one year after he leaves that body."
3. 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980).
4. Id. at 259-60, 420 A.2d at 441. Prior to 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution did not contain an explicit grant of rulemaking power to the supreme court
to regulate the practice of law. Such power is generally recognized as
"inherent" in the judicial branch in virtually all American states as an integral
part of the tripartite system of government. See R. DISHMAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT (rev. ed. 1968); Beardsley, The Judicial
Claim to Inherent Power over the Bar, 19 A.B.A. J. 509 (1933); Jeffers, Government of the Legal Profession: An Inherent Judicial Power Approach, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 385 (1978); Kalish, The Nebraska Supreme Court, the Practice of
Law and the Regulation of Attorneys, 59 NEB. L. REV. 555 (1980); Robertson &
Buehler, The Separation of Powers and the Regulation of the Practice of Law
in Oregon, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 273 (1977); Comment, The Supreme Court's
Power over Admission and Disbarments:Inherent or Statutory?, 25 BAYLOR L.
REV. 368 (1973); Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57

14

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 20:13

monwealth Court extended the Wajert holding to attorneys
employed by a State administrative agency,5 and has similarly
dispatched the financial disclosure requirements of the Act' as
applied to judges' and as applied to public employees serving as
attorneys.8
The reasoning behind this line of cases appears to be that
legislatively enacted prohibitions and requirements, even if contained in a statute of general applicability, that is, one directed
at the public as a whole rather than solely or mainly at attorneys, 9 cannot be applied to judges or attorneys if the activities in any way concern the practice of law. The Pennsylvania
courts have concluded that the regulation of such practice is exL. REV. 975 (1972); Comment, Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 715 (1969); Note, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN.
CORNELL

L.

REV.

783 (1976).

The scope of the supreme court's inherent power to regulate practice and
procedure was never determined conclusively in Pennsylvania, because an explicit grant of rulemaking power was statutorily conferred by the legislature.
Act of June 21, 1937, No. 392, § 1, 1937 Pa. Laws 392 (codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 61 (Purdon 1962)(repealed 1978)(current version at PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 1722 (Purdon 1981))). "[Als long as the power was there, its
source was not of great importance." In re Pa. C. S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 528,
394 A.2d 444, 447 (1978).
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 in article V, section 10(c) granted explicit rulemaking power to the supreme court over matters of practice and procedure and over conduct of the bar. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
5. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n Bar Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d
1327 (1981 Pa. Commw. Ct.).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 404(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981) provides: "No
public official shall be allowed to take the oath of office or enter or continue
upon his duties, nor shall he receive compensation from public funds, unless he
has filed a statement of financial interests with the commission as required by
this act." Id. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 405 provides:
(a) The statement of financial interests filed pursuant to this act shall
be . . . signed under penalty of perjury by the person required to file the
statement.
(b) The statement shall include ... information for the prior calendar
year with regard to the person required to file the statement and the
members of his immediate family ....
Id.
7. Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. 160, 424 A.2d 968
(1981), appeal docketed, Nos. 81-3-408 and 81-3-409 (Pa. May 22, 1981).
8. Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 424 A.2d 983
(1981), aff'd on other grounds, 436 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1981).
9. For a discussion of the distinction between general and limited applicability, see text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra.
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clusively within the control of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
and any statutes affecting conduct in this area are unconstitutional, whether or not they actually conflict with supreme court
rules for the governance of the bar.
Although the result in Wajert is defensible on public policy
grounds,'0 the court's reasoning in reaching the result is contrary
to settled principles of separation of powers normally applied in
Pennsylvania as well as in other jurisdictions." By striking down
portions of the Ethics Act, the courts have excepted members of
the judiciary and the bar from the general law applicable to
other citizens, and have done so without an examination of
whether such an exception is necessary to prevent interference
with proper supreme court governance of the bar.
This article will present an alternative approach, consistent
with the Pennsylvania Constitution, which allows the Pennsylvania Supreme Court full control over the conduct of
members of the bar without needlessly interfering with the
legitimate exercise of the legislature's police power in preventing conflicts-of-interest among public employees. Under this approach the supreme court, as a matter of comity, allows application of the Ethics Act to attorneys and judges, except in those
cases where the statute actually conflicts with rules promulgated
by the court or where the statute has a deleterious effect on the
court's view of the proper functioning of the state's legal system.
The proposed approach is applicable in the many states that
have both a constitutional grant of authority to a supreme court
and recently enacted ethics laws similar to those of Pennsylvania." This restrained approach is necessary to preserve the
effectiveness of the important and popularly mandated ethics
laws, which might be severely hampered by an extension of the
present Pennsylvania ideology into other states."3
10. A stringent post-employment restriction may discourage qualified candidates from seeking a judgeship. See text accompanying notes 69-81 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 36-44 infra.
12. See note 4 supra and note 15 infra.
13. Pennsylvania is the only state in which a provision of the state ethics
law has been directly and clearly held unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation-of-powers doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld, against such a challenge, application of the state's financial disclosure
laws to members of the bar. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass.
795, 376 N.E.2d 810 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that the
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THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH

A.

The Pennsylvania Ethics Act

In 1978, Pennsylvania passed a state ethics act and joined a
substantial number of states that, during the 1970's, enacted
statutes designed to eliminate conflicts-of-interest involving
public officials." The stated purpose of the Pennsylvania Ethics
Act is "to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of
the State in their government" by assuring that "the financial interests of holders of or candidates for public office present
neither a conflict nor the appearance of a conflict with the public
trust."15
The Pennsylvania Ethics Act is similar in form and substance
to most other state ethics laws."6 It contains several criminal prohibitions designed to ensure that public employees do not use
their positions for personal financial gain," a post-employment
restriction which prohibits certain contacts between former
public employees and the governmental bodies with which they
served,'8 and a financial disclosure provision which requires
public employees and candidates for public office to file
Florida Legislature did not have constitutional power to enact an ethics code to
govern the judiciary. In re The Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975). The actual
holding in the case, however, was that members of the bar, when serving "in an
administrative or supervisory capacity necessary to operate the Bar and the
judicial system," were-not "officers or employees of the state" subject to-the
financial disclosure requirement. Id. at 47. A similar issue is presently pending
before the Supreme Court of Montana in State Bar of Montana v. Krivec, No.
81-35 (Mont. 1981).
14. By waiting until 1978, Pennsylvania was a relative latecomer in this
area. One commentator has noted:
The movement that has produced an ethics code of some type for public
officials and employees in more than 40 states . . . was initiated when
citizen's councils and organizations proposed reform legislation during the
late 1960s. Most such legislation languished until the catalyst of
Watergate. In 1973, Ohio's General Assembly passed its ethics law and
many other legislatures were pressed for action in 1973 and 1974.
Terapak, Administering Ethics Laws: The Ohio Experience, 68 NATL CIV. REV.
82, 82 (1979[hereinafter cited as Terapak]. Also in 1978, Congress passed the
Ethics in Government Act. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. 11 1978)).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
16. For an excellent review of the provisions of many state ethics laws, see
R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 8.5[5] (1976).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 403(a)-(c), (h) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 403(e).(Purdon Supp. 1981).
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statements listing certain personal financial interests which
might conflict with their public duties. 9 A state ethics commission was created to administer the Act and to investigate complaints against officials for violations of the substantive prohibitions .20
B.

The Challenge- Wajert v. State Ethics Commission

Pennsylvania judges and attorneys have challenged both the
post-employment restriction and the financial disclosure requirement, claiming that these portions of the Act cannot constitutionally be applied to them." The first of the challenges, Wajert
v. State Ethics Commission,' was brought by a trial court judge
questioning the applicability of the post-employment restriction,
section 3(e) of the Act, to him. Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act prohibits any former public official from representing a person on
any matter before'the governmental body with which he was
associated for a period of one year after leaving that body."3
Responding to a request for an advisory opinion from John M.
Wajert, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
the State Ethics Commission determined that "a Common Pleas
Judge is barred by section 3(e) of the Act from representing any
person before the Court with which he was associated for a
period of one year following resignation or retirement." 4
Thereupon, Judge Wajert filed a petition for a declaratory

19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 404 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 406-408 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
21. Various provisions of the Ethics Act have survived challenges on other
grounds, including claims that the Act was so vague as to deny due process; unconstitutionally infringed the right of privacy; violated the state constitutional
provision pertaining to the appointing power of the governor; violated the right
to a republican form of government; unconstitutionally discriminated against
local officials; unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority; and violated
the state equal rights amendment. Snider v. Thornburgh, 436 A.2d 593 (Pa.
1981); Pennsylvania State Ass'n of Twp. Supvrs v. Thornburgh, 437 A.2d 1 (Pa.
1981). The only constitutional infirmity found by the court in these two cases
was that the exclusion of appointed, noncompensated officials from the definition of "public official" violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.
22. 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 403(e) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See note 2 supra
24. 491 Pa. at 258, 420 A.2d at 440 (quoting Advisory Opinion 1978-5 (May
11, 1979)).
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judgment in the commonwealth court, seeking to have the Ethics
Act declared unconstitutional in its application to judges and
justices of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The commonwealth court held the post-employment restriction inapplicable to former judges, concluding that the term "governmental body" was not meant to include a court of law.25 The court so
construed the provision because it believed a contrary construction might render it unconstitutional as "a direct restriction upon
the practice of law" and a "usurpation of the exclusive power of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to regulate the practice of
law."26
C.

The Supreme Court's Resolution-Exclusive
Supreme Court Control

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the
constitutional issue. Holding first that the term "governmental
body" includes courts of law, and that the prohibition was
therefore intended to apply to Judge Wajert,27 the court went on
to declare the statute an unconstitutional "infringement on the
Supreme Court's inherent and exclusive power to govern the
conduct of those privileged to practice law in this Commonwealth." 8
Relying on its inherent power, reaffirmed in section 10(c) of
the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution,' the court stated that the
25. Wajert v. State Ethics Comm'n, 47 Pa. Commw. Ct. 97, 407 A.2d 125
(1979), aff'd, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980).
26. Id. at 107, 407 A.2d at 130.
27. Wajert v. State Ethics Comm'n, 491 Pa. 255, 261, 420 A.2d 439, 442
(1980).
28. Id. at 262, 420 A.2d at 442.
29. The argument over whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's power
to regulate court procedure and the practice of law was inherent in the constitution or was granted by the legislature, see note 4 supra,was laid to rest by
article V, section 10(c) of the constitution of 1968, which provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the
peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or
decrees of any court or justice of the peace, including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or classes of
appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall require, and
for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of all
courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules
are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor
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professional conduct of all persons engaged in the practice of
law, including former judges, was to be exclusively regulated by
the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement"0 and the
Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility, 3' as adopted by
the supreme court. The rules were to "supersede all other court
rules and statutes pertaining to disciplinary enforcement
heretofore promulgated."3 The court pointed out that in adopting
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from accepting private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he acted in a judicial
capacity, the court has already exercised its inherent power "to

modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the
General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of
the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All
laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with
rules prescribed under these provisions.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). While this section does not use the word "exclusive,"
the supreme court has, on several occasions, determined that the grant of
power to control court procedure and the conduct of the bar was exclusive:
"[Tihere is. simply no substantial support for the proposition that the grant of
authority in Article V, § 10(c) is anything other than exclusive." In re Pa. C. S.
§ 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 529, 394 A.2d 444, 448 (1978). Accord, Garrett v. Bamford,
582 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1978); Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 378 A.2d 780
(1977).
30. PA. R.D.E. The Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement do not contain a
substantive code of behavior, but provide the procedural mechanism used to
discipline an attorney for violation of the disciplinary rules contained in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. PA. R.D.E. 103 reads:
The Supreme Court declares that it has inherent and exclusive power
to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are its officers (which power is
reasserted in Section 10(c) of Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania) and in furtherance thereof promulgates these rules which shall
supersede all other court rules and statutes pertaining to disciplinary enforcement heretofore promulgated.
Id.
31. By its order of February 27, 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (adopted August 12, 1969
and amended February 27, 1970) as the standard of conduct for attorneys of all
the courts of the commonwealth. The Code contains Ethical Considerations,
which "represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive," and Disciplinary Rules, which "unlike the Ethical Considerations
are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary ac-

tion."
32.

PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

491 Pa.. at 262, 420 A.2d at 442 (quoting PA. R.D.E. 103).
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deal with the mischief" the Ethics Act attempts to address.33
The court limited the holding to former judges and specifically
declined to decide whether the statute is unconstitutional when
applied to other attorneys. 4 The court recognized, however, that
the language of its opinion seems to indicate its applicability to
all attorneys practicing in Pennsylvania, because it speaks of exclusive supreme court control of the conduct of attorneys, rather
than only judges or the court system. 5
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE WAJERT PROBLEM

A.

The Scope of Legislative Power over the Bar

It is abundantly clear that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has paramount control over the practice of law in the state.3" The

33. Id. But see Shapiro, The Post-Employment Restrictions of the Ohio
Ethics Law: Prior Practice and Recent Amendments, 7 OHIO NORTH. L. REV.
913 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Shapiro](DR 9-101(A) and section 3(e) of the
Ethics Act do not deal with the same mischief). DR 9-101(A), and any other
post-employment restriction limited to matters in which the employee has participated, is directed primarily at the mischief of misuse of confidential information. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62
A.B.A. J. 517 (1976)[hereinafter cited as ABA OPINION 342]; Kaufman, The
Former Government Attorney and the Canons of ProfessionalEthics, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 657 (1957); Shapiro, supra, at 919-21. On the other hand, postemployment restrictions such as section 3(e), which prohibit all representation
before the former agency for a period of time, are addressed to the mischief of
undue influence with former colleagues. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THE FEDERAL SERVICE

46 (1960)

[hereinafter cited as
INTEREST

ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR]; R. VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OFREGULATION IN THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH 84 (1979)
cited as VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST]; Shapiro, supra, at 921-24.

[hereinafter
34. 491 Pa. at 261 n.5, 420 A.2d at 442 n.5. The commonwealth court,
however, extended the Wajert holding to attorneys employed by a state administrative agency. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n Bar Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). See text accompanying notes 79-80
infra.
35. The court stated:
We are not unmindful that the reasons set forth infra for our ruling
strongly suggest the statute is also unconstitutional in application to attorneys who seek to practice in Pennsylvania's courts. We need not now
so rule and explicitly refrain from doing so, but feel compelled to point
out our conscious consideration of the possible breadth of our ruling.
491 Pa. at 261 n.5, 420 A.2d at 442 n.5.
36. In many states, this power is considered inherent in the supreme court
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court develops the substantive requirements and procedures for
admission to the bar 7 and ultimately determines a candidate's
admissibility.' The supreme court also imposes ethical standards
for the practice of law," establishes procedures for administering
noncriminal disciplinary action for violation of the ethical standards," and again ultimately determines when and against whom
such sanctions are to be applied.41
The exclusive power of the supreme court to govern the conby virtue of constitutional language that vests judicial power in the supreme
court. See note 4 supra. In Pennsylvania, this power was explicitly granted by
the constitution of 1968. See note 29 supra. The separation of powers in most
states differs somewhat from that of the federal system because Congress has
considerably more control over the judicial system than do most state
legislatures. Congress's power derives from its constitutional authority "[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
9. The power to control federal judicial procedure has, to a great extent,
however, been delegated by Congress to the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2071
(1976)..
Therefore, although the judicial financial disclosure requirements of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, see note 14 supra, were challenged by
federal judges, Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981), the discussion proceeded along somewhat different
lines. The plaintiff judges could not argue, as did Judge Wajert, that the
legislature had no power to control the conduct of the judiciary. The Duplantier
decision takes this as given. The only question was whether the statute unduly
impeded "the operation of a coordinate branch of government." 606 F.2d at 667.
Indeed, Congress is manifestly empowered to declare that a judge be disqualified "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). If Congress has the constitutional authority to require a judge to disqualify himself from adjudicating certain issues
on the ground of financial interest, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), mandating a
judge to disclose his personal financial interests is a fortiori an objective
within the constitutional authority of Congress.
The intrusion upon the constitutionally assigned functions of the
judiciary made by the Act is justified by the promotion of important objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. The Act,
therefore, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Id. at 668. Although the reasoning used by the Duplantier court in upholding
the federal ethics law proceeded along the lines advocated in this article, the
decision is not direct authority for using such an approach in Pennsylvania or
other states where the legislatures have less control over the conduct of the
judiciary.

37.

PENNSYLVANIA BAR ADMISSION RULES,

adopted June 6, 1977.

38. PA. B.A.R. 222.
39. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See note 31 supra.
40. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT. See note 30
supra.
41. PA. R.D.E. 208(e).
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duct of the judiciary and the bar does not inherently render a
statute touching upon the professional activities of a judge or an
attorney unconstitutional. A distinction must be drawn between
a statute directed only at attorneys and a statute directed at
some larger class of the public, some of whom might be attorneys. Consider, for example, a statute requiring all attorneys
to pay a fee of two and one quarter percent of the income from
their practice in order to remain members of the bar. Given the
exclusive power of the supreme court to set the fees required to
practice law in Pennsylvania,42 such a statute would surely be unconstitutional. Yet, few would argue that the requirement that
all Pennsylvanians, including attorneys, pay a tax of two and one
quarter percent of their income is anything but a legitimate exercise of the legislative taxing power.4 3
The Pennsylvania Ethics Act is directed at public officials and
employees and seeks to diminish the evils that might flow from
conflicts-of-interest among those persons. Some of the public officials and employees covered are attorneys; many are not. The
mere fact that a public official is also an attorney, or that a person's law practice might incidentally be affected by the statute is
not, of itself, sufficient justification for holding the statute unconstitutional.44
42. To defray the costs of disciplinary enforcement, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement require payment of an annual fee of forty dollars by
every attorney admitted to practice before the Pennsylvania courts. PA. R.D.E.
219.
43. This is nothing more than a description of the Pennsylvania income tax.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7301 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
44. Even in the area of the most direct control on the practice of lawqualifications and procedures for admission to the bar-some states have
allocated part of the role to the legislature, by allowing it to prescribe standards and procedures for admission to the bar, while leaving to the supreme
court the actual decision about who shall be admitted and who shall be disbarred. Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 P. 646 (1911); In re Greathouse, 189
Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933); State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603
(1928). This is certainly a minority view today, and is not now and never has
been the law in Pennsylvania.
It is not a purpose of this article to suggest that the Pennsylvania
Legislature has or should have the power to prescribe rules for the governance
of the bar. Such power has been granted to the supreme court by article V, section 10(c) of the constitution and "a power does not inhere to the legislature if it
specifically has been withheld or entrusted to another co-equal branch of
government." Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 273, 378 A.2d 780, 788
(1977). But as noted in the text, although it might incidentally affect the prac-
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B.

The Overlap of Judicial and Legislative Power

Although the Wajert court is not explicit as to the scope of
the supreme court's exclusive power to govern the conduct of
the bench and the bar, the court seems to limit the power to the
professional activities of attorneys and judges." Yet, even this
limited interpretation of the court's power has never been the
law in Pennsylvania. Many criminal statutes of general applicability are routinely applied to attorneys even when the proscription involves their professional conduct. For example, Pennsylvania has defined tampering with witnesses as a criminal offense.46 The application of the statute to an attorney involved in
a court case certainly involves "governing the professional conduct" of an attorney, yet the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to a practicing attorney cannot be doubted.
Alternatively, consider the application of a criminal bribery
statute to a state court judge. A statute making it a crime for a
public official to accept a pecuniary benefit in exchange for official action, 7 applied to a judge, constitutes direct control of the
judge's judicial behavior. It is unlikely, however, that the
supreme court would view the bribery statute as an infringement of its exclusive power to govern the conduct of the
judiciary in the pursuit of their professional activities.4 8
tice of law by some attorneys, the State Ethics Act is not an attempt to
regulate the practice of law in Pennsylvania, as would be, for example, a
statute which prescribed minimum standards of education for admission to the
bar.
45. 491 Pa. at 262, 420 A.2d at 442. At four points in its opinion the court
declares its "exclusive power to govern the conduct of those privileged to practice law in this Commonwealth," i& at 260, 262, 420 A.2d at 441, 442, without
any express limitation as to the scope of that power. The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the rules arising thereunder, however, are described by the
court as "standards governing the professional conduct of those engaged in the
practice of law." Id at 262, 420 A.2d at 442. It seems unlikely that the court
views its exclusive authority as being without limitation. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4952 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
47. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701"(Purdon 1973).
48. Conflict-of-interest statutes are distinguishable from other criminal
statutes in that the prohibited activity is not itself morally wrong, but is prohibited in order to prevent placing the official in a situation where he might
commit a wrongful act. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR, supra note 33, at 19; VAUGHN,
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST,

supra note 33, at 1; Shapiro, supra note 33, at 913-14.

For example, the Pennsylvania post-employment restriction at issue in Wajert
prohibited appearances before an official's former agency, not because all such
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It is apparent from these examples that the separation of
powers between the judicial and the legislative branches is not
absolute. Although the supreme court may have inherent power
to control the conduct of the bar, the legislature, through the exercise of its police power to provide for an effective government
free of bribery and corruption, also has authority to regulate the
conduct of public officials and employees. The supreme courts of
other states have recognized that an overlap of functions may exist 9 and that it is possible for the judiciary to allow some
legislative regulation in this area of overlap without relinquishing ultimate control of the judiciary and the bar.
C.

Evaluating Legislation in the Area of Overlap-A
FunctionalApproach

In a case holding that complaints against attorneys received
by the state bar association were not exempt from the Inspection
of Public Records Law,"0 the Supreme Court of Oregon stated:
"The separation of powers principle cannot in practice work absolutely; there is a necessary overlap between the governmental
functions. The rule has evolved that legislation can affect the
practice of law so long as it does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the judiciary.""
Because the ultimate decision about whether any statute
creates an impermissible burden or interference rests with the
supreme court, the approach suggested by the Supreme Court of
Oregon does not involve any surrender of the court's powers.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has aptly considered this
an application of comity:

appearances would result in improper influence being exerted, but because such
appearances could present the opportunity for improper influence. Exempting
attorneys from such a prophylactic statute is not as unseemly as exempting
them from a bribery or tampering statute, but such special treatment "would
be an exceedingly unpopular action which, in the long run, can only damage
public confidence in the legal profession." Brief of Amicus Curiae Montana Commissioner of Political Practices at 4, Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa: Commw.Ct. 240, 424 A.2d 968, 436 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1981).
49. See note 13 supra, and notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
50. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-.500 (1973).
51. Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or. 279, 285, 550 P.2d 1218, 1222
(1976)(emphasis added). Accord, Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or. 383, 347 P.2d 594
(1959).
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The fact that the ultimate power to regulate the conduct of attorneys is inherently in the judicial department does not mean
that other departments of government cannot also in some
respects act in such an area as this. We note, for example, that
the Legislature has conferred upon the attorney general authority
to prosecute in the Supreme Judicial Court an attorney charged
with conducting himself in a manner unworthy of an attorney. 4
M.R.S.A. §§ 851-856. This authority remains an alternative to the
adjudication of attorney disciplinary matters pursuant to the
Maine Bar Rules.
In addition, the Legislature has enacted certain statutes
relating to the admission and reinstatement of attorneys, which
statutes the Supreme Judicial Court honors 52as a matter of comity,
but not in surrender of its inherent power.
The Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes that the legislature
is not wholly barred from passing legislation which may impact
on areas within the supreme court's control. Article V, section 10
(c), after granting rulemaking power to the supreme court over
court procedures and the practice of law, provides that "[a]ll laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with
rules prescribed under these provisions.' ' The suspension of all
laws inconsistent with supreme court rules would seem to indicate by implication that the power exists to legislate in this
area, as long as the legislation is not inconsistent with supreme
court rules.52. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002-03 (Me.
1980)(footnotes omitted).
53. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). See note 29 supra.
54. In Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. 160, 424 A.2d
968 (1981), Judge Craig dissented stating:
We cannot overlook the point that Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c), as adopted
by the citizens of the Commonwealth to invest the Supreme Court with
the power of governance over the conduct of all courts, concludes by
stating:
All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent
with rules prescribed under these provisions.
That sentence makes clear that legislation relating to judges, as part of
the class of all public officials, is not barred except as it may conflict with
judicial rules of conduct.
Id at 169, 424 A.2d at 972 (Craig, J., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, has given just the opposite interpretation of this sentence:
"Moreover, the constitutional provision's explicit statement. . . that court-made
rules will prevail against any statutes that might be inconsistent with them
would be incongruous with a scheme in which the legislature exercised concurrent rule-making power." In re Pa. C. S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 529, 394 A.2d 444,
448 (1978).
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The Wajert opinion does not discuss whether the postemployment restriction of the Ethics Act is inconsistent with
supreme court rules. The court merely mentions that an existing
disciplinary rule deals "with the mischief the statute attempts to
address.""5 But one need only consider the bribery and witness
tampering examples' to conclude that legislative enactments are
not inconsistent and therefore invalid merely because they impact on the same mischief as a supreme court rule. An attorney's
violation of either of the two criminal statutes constitutes a
violation of at least one of the disciplinary rules as well. 7
That neither the bribery nor the witness tampering statute
imposes additional restrictions on the conduct of attorneys not
already contained in the disciplinary rules distinguishes the two
statutes from the post-employment restriction in Wajert.8
Nonetheless, because the two statutes provide stiffer criminal
penalties and an alternative enforcement mechanism, they do
represent, at least to some extent, legislative control over the
conduct of members of the bar in an area regulated by the
disciplinary rules.59
Consider for the purpose of comparison legislative enactments
that are actually inconsistent with the disciplinary rules. Inconsistent legislation falls into two basic categories: Statutes requiring conduct proscribed by the rules, for example, requiring
disclosure of confidential client communication, 0 and statutes
55. 491 Pa. at 262, 420 A.2d at 442. But see note 33 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 supra.
57. Witness tampering constitutes a violation of DR 7-109(B). Bribery constitutes a violation of DR 7-110(A).
58. The statute involved in Wajert imposed both a more restrictive prohibition and different penalties than did the applicable disciplinary rule.
59. The existence of criminal penalties and their enforcement by the
criminal justice authorities may add to the deterrent effect already provided by
the disciplinary rules, making such misconduct less likely. One of the prime
reasons for the establishment of state ethics commissions was the public
perception that government administrative agencies and self-regulatory bodies
such as state and local bar associations were not adequately enforcing existing
conflict-of-interest rules. COMMON CAUSE, SERVING Two MASTERS: A COMMON
CAUSE STUDY OF CONFLICTS-OF-INTERESTS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1976);
Shapiro, supra note 33, at 926 n.54.
60. For example, DR 4-101(B) prohibits an attorney from revealing a client
confidence except "when permitted under DR 4-101(C)." Any statute that required an attorney to reveal such a confidence would clearly be inconsistent
with the rule.
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proscribing conduct specifically required by the rules, for example, requiring that knowledge of another attorney's misconduct
be withheld from the authorities."'
An inconsistent statute, such as that requiring disclosure of
confidential client communications, would run afoul of article V,
section 10(c) of the constitution6 2 and would clearly interfere with
the supreme court's view of the proper administration of justice as
manifested by the rules. Statutory limitations on the rule requiring confidentiality of client communications restrict the flow of
information from client to attorney, thereby lessening the ability
of the attorney to adequately represent the client's interest and
the ability of the courts to ascertain the truth. Hence, even if the
statute were enacted for a valid legislative purpose and were not
directed solely at attorneys, it would constitute an impermissible
interference with the judicial function.
The Wajert rationale provides no mechanism for distinguishing between bribery and witness tampering statutes on
the one hand and post-employment restrictions on the other. The
court's broad assertion of exclusive control over the professional
conduct of attorneys must be reconsidered in light of the absence
of absolute separation of legislative and judicial powers. A functional analysis, based upon the extent to which the legislation encroaches upon the realm of supreme court control, can be applied
by the court to refine its definition of exclusive power without
relinquishing ultimate control. This functional analysis asks two
questions: First, to what extent is the statute's requirement inconsistent with supreme court rules; second, to what extent will
application of the statute impede the supreme court's reasoned
view of the proper functioning of the system of administering
justice in the state.
IV.

APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE WAJERT
CASE

The statute under consideration in Wajert fell somewhere be-

61. For example, DR 1-103 requires that an attorney with knowledge of
another attorney's misconduct "shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or
other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such a violation." A
statute that would prohibit such a report would be inconsistent with the rule.
62. See note 29 supra.
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tween the two above-mentioned examples. Although it did prohibit some conduct not prohibited by the disciplinary rules, the
additional prohibition did not involve conduct specifically required by the rules. 3
A.

Is the Statute Inconsistent with Supreme Court Rules?

One could argue that any time a statute proscribes activity not
prohibited by the rules, the statute is inconsistent with the
rules. The proper inquiry, however, should focus on the extent to
which the lack of a prohibition in the rules constitutes passive
approval of the behavior in question, or a desire that the
behavior should continue, or both. There are many reasons why
rulemaking bodies," including courts, do not prohibit certain conduct, not all of which reasons indicate approval of, or much less a
desire for, the conduct in question. A court may never have considered whether the conduct was proper and useful, or whether
it was improper and harmful. 5 Or the court, although disapprov63. The two applicable sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibit private employment by a former public employee only in matters in
which he participated while a public employee. DR 9-101(A) provides: "A lawyer
shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he
has acted in a judicial capacity." DR 9-101(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility
while he was a public employee." The post-employment restriction of the Ethics
Act prohibits representation before the former agency for one year on any mat-,
ter, whether or not the former employee participated as a public employee. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 403(e) (Purdon Supp. 1981). Therefore, a former judge appearing before a court on which he had served six months earlier, representing
a client on an entirely new case, constitutes an example of conduct prohibited
by the statute, which conduct was neither prohibited nor required by the
disciplinary rules.
64. "Rulemaking bodies" in this context is meant to include any agency,
whether normally considered a part of the legislative, judicial, or executive
branch, when that agency performs the function of establishing substantive
standards of conduct for those under its control.
65. This article and the opinions of Pennsylvania courts denote the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as the "rulemaking body" in this area. However, the
actual language of the Code of Professional Responsibility was drafted by
various committees of the American Bar Association (ABA). See Armstrong,
Codes of Professional Responsibility, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 2-6 (1978). Therefore, much of
the actual decision making about what conduct should be. prohibited was done
by the ABA, and not by the court itself, which adopted, on February 27, 1974,
the entire Code of Professional Responsibility as it had been adopted by the
ABA on August 12, 1969, and amended on February 27, 1970. Although certain
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ing of the conduct, may have determined that it was not worth
the effort to promulgate and enforce a ban on the activity. In
either case, a prohibition passed by another governmental agency is not necessarily inconsistent with the court's rules.
On the other hand, rules such as Disciplinary Rule 9-101(A) and
(B)," prohibiting certain attorney conduct by former judges and
government employees, may represent a carefully drawn line, indicating that conduct not falling on the prohibited side of the line
should be allowed. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(A) and (B) are more
narrowly drawn restrictions than the post-employment restriction of the Pennsylvania Ethics Act, because they prohibit
employment only in those matters in which the former official
has acted in an official capacity. Although there is some evidence
that these rules were passed with the expectation that postemployment conduct not covered would be allowed,87 there is also
some indication that the problem to which the broader Ethics
Act restriction is addressed-undue influence with former colleagues-was never considered when the disciplinary rules were
formulated." It is not entirely clear, therefore, whether section
3(e) of the Ethics Act is actually inconsistent with the disciplinary rules.
provisions of the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility have since
been amended by the supreme court, DR 9-101(A) and (B) remain as originally
adopted in both the ABA and Pennsylvania Codes.
66. See note 63 supra.
67. The predecessor of DR 9-101(B), Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, was somewhat stricter than the present provision. Canon 36
prohibited a former public official from accepting employment "in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office

or employ." ABA

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

No. 36. When the Canons of

Professional Ethics were replaced by the Code of Professional Responsibility in
1970, the prohibition was narrowed to apply only to those matters "in which he
had substantial responsibilitywhile he was a public employee." DR 9-101(B) (emphasis added). One of the purposes of this change was to allow employment in
those cases in which the employee's participation had been minimal or pro forma:
But, "passed upon" proved to be too broadly encompassing; for example,
it was held under Canon 36 that a lawyer could not accept employment in
connection with a land title which he had passed upon in a perfunctory
manner, the title having been before him for consideration only because
title reports were made in his name as assistant chief title examiner or in
the name of the chief title examiner. ABA OPINION 342, supra note 33, at

519 (citing ABA

COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,

No. 37 (1931)).

68. See note 33 supra. A guide for attorneys published by the ABA, when
listing the objectives of restraining former government officials, does not in-
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What is the Impact on the Judicial System?

What motivated the supreme court to strike down section 3(e)
as applied to former judges remains unstated by the court, with
the exception, perhaps, of a seemingly off-point footnote in the
opinion." What properly should have concerned the supreme
court was the possible deleterious effects of the statute on the
Pennsylvania justice system.
All post-employment restrictions make government service
somewhat less attractive by decreasing employment opportunities available after leaving government service. 0 The
broader the post-employment restriction, the greater is the
disincentive toward public office." Disciplinary Rule 9-101(A),
which prohibits a former judge from accepting employment only
in those matters in which he has acted upon the merits in his
judicial capacity, has little effect on the law practice of a former
judge" and therefore provides little, if any, disincentive to
elude the possibility of undue influence with the former agency. Jordan, Ethical
Issues Arising from Present or Past Government Service, in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 189
(1978)[hereinafter cited as Jordan].
69. 491 Pa. at 261 n.5, 420 A.2d 439, 442 n.5 (1980). See text accompanying
note 76 infra.
70. One author stated:
The cost, it is alleged, of ... more extensive post-employment limitations is substantial. One cost is a reduction in the ability of government
agencies to recruit highly qualified personnel ....
The concern regarding recruitment is premised on the belief that a
substantial number of talented people enter government service with the intent to serve in government for awhile, gain experience and expertise, and
then leave to seek more lucrative employment in the private sector ....
A person who considers employment may well consider the future options that a position provides. This may be the case if the employee intends to remain in the position. A position that automatically reduces
employment options is thereby not as attractive as a fundamentally equal
position that does not.
VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST, supra note 33, at 85.
71. "[Ilf the rules are Draconian, those leaving the government will be
unreasonably restricted in their employment opportunities, and those in private
employment will find government service too great a sacrifice." Jordan, supra
note 68, at 190.
72. DR 9-101(A) leaves the former judge free to accept employment in any
matter in which he did not act on the merits. Even if the judge intended to
practice before the court on which he sat, he could represent clients on any pending cases that had been handled by other judges or had not yet been decided on
the merits and on any new matters filed after his resignation. In most in-
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becoming a judge. Application of section 3(e), however, to most
retiring common pleas judges would have a devastating effect on
their practice of law."3 A good trial attorney who is a prospective
candidate for a common pleas judgeship might think long and
hard about accepting the post if he knew that he could not appear before the common pleas courts of that county for one year
after retiring from the bench." Some qualified prospective
judges might decline the position because of the existence of this
restriction. 5
This reasoning is applicable not only to judges, but to any
employees of the Pennsylvania courts who might wish later to
practice before such courts. In fact, the concern about adverse
consequences to the Pennsylvania courts is voiced in the Wajert
opinion, not in regard to judges, but in regard to law clerks:
[Gliven our interpretation of the statute and its application to
courts of law and its possible application to law clerks, see 65 P.S.
§ 402, the courts of this Commonwealth might be effectively
precluded from employing law school graduates as law clerks
because persons would fear such employment would prohibit
them from practicing before the court by which they were
employed for one year after the termination of their
employment."6

stances, the percentage of cases in which he would be disqualified would be
very small.
73. This is based on the assumption that a retiring trial level judge, when
he re-entered practice, would most likely do so as a trial attorney and would
most likely practice in the same county in which he sat as a judge. This would
be precisely the activity prohibited by section 3(e) of the Ethics Act.
74. This would be especially bothersome to an attorney considering an appointment to a judicial vacancy. Rather than serving the full ten-year term, PA.
CONST. art. V, § 15, he would have to run for re-election as early as "the next
municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs." PA. CONST.
art. V,§ 13 (1968, amended 1979). He would thus have to consider the possibility
that a judicial tenure of approximately one year could result in a restriction on
his practice for a full year thereafter.
75. This negative effect of a post-employment restriction such as section
3(e) has led most state legislatures that have adopted post-employment restrictions to pattern the statutes after the Code of Professional Responsibility, prohibiting employment only in matters in which the employee has participated
rather than prohibiting all practice before the former agency. Of the 16 states
that have enacted statutory post-employment restrictions, only Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4(e)(2)(Supp. 1980), and South Carolina, S.C. CODE §
8-13-490 (1976), have enacted provisions similar to that of Pennsylvania. See
Shapiro, supra note 33, at 914, 921.
76. 491 Pa. at 261 n.5, 420 A.2d at 442 n.5. Ironically, by the time Wajert
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While the effect on the Pennsylvania courts' ability to hire
competent judges would be less severe than on their ability to
hire law clerks,77 the application of section 3(e) to judges would,
it seems, lower the quality of the Pennsylvania bench." It is
clearly within the constitutional power and duty of the supreme
court to declare unconstitutional a statute which, when applied
to the judiciary, would have a deleterious effect on the quality of
judges and therefore presumably on the quality of justice administered in the Pennsylvania courts.
V.

APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH BEYOND WAJERT

A.

Former Government Attorneys

The same functional analysis of section 3(e) might lead to a different result in the case of former government attorneys who
have not been employed in the judicial branch. The first such
case to reach the supreme court will likely be Pennsylvania
9 In
Public Utility Commission Bar Association v. Thornburgh."
was decided, the Ethics Commission had determined that law clerks were not
considered public employees under the Act, and therefore were not subject to
the post-employment restriction. 51 PA. CODE § 1.1 (promulgated pursuant to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 407(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981)).
77. The position of law clerk to a judge is generally a short-term position
of one or two years. It is neither a high-status nor a high-salary position and is
almost invariably sought for the experience and the future practice opportunities it presents. Thus, application of the post-employment statute to a law
clerk would, to a great extent, nullify the most attractive aspect of the job.
Although it might not totally preclude the hiring of a law school graduate for
this important position, as feared by the Wajert court, it would at least greatly
reduce the quality of those willing to serve. The effect on the quality of those
willing to serve as judges would be considerably less, because a judgeship, with
higher status and pay, a longer term, and other important benefits would remain attractive to many attorneys in spite of the post-employment restriction.
78. The assumption here is that reducing the number of qualified persons
willing to accept the position will normally decrease the quality of those eventually chosen to serve. But see VAUGHN, CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST, supra note 33,
at 86:
No firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect on recruitment
and retention patterns of more extensive limitations on post-employment
activities .... If the imposition of such limitations alters recruitment patterns, it is not clear that the alteration of thesepatterns necessarily will
have an adverse effect on the quality of government service. Different
people may be attracted to public service, but it is not clear that they will
be less qualified.
Id
79. 434 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
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that case, the commonwealth court, relying on Wajert, held section 3(e) of the Ethics Act unconstitutional as applied to attorneys employed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, allowing the attorneys to represent clients before the Commission within one year of leaving its employ. 0
As in the Wajert case, the statutory restriction is more stringent than the disciplinary rule, but whether it is inconsistent
with the rule is again a difficult question to answer. In this case,
however, the effect on the judicial system is considerably less
than that in Wajert: it is perhaps even nonexistent.
In Wajert, the existence of the statute could lead prospective
judges to decline the position because of the effect of the postemployment restriction on their practice, thereby reducing the
quantity and quality of prospective members of the bench. In the
case of the 'attorneys, the same effect would lead only to a
lessening of the number of persons willing to work for the Public
Utility Commission. While this might have an adverse effect on
the quality of the Commission, it is not a proper concern of the
supreme court. The Public Utility Commission is a creation of
the legislature8 1 and subject to legislative, not judicial, control. 2
Whether the salutary effects of the post-employment restriction
justify any possible adverse side effects on the Commission is
purely a question for the legislature to decide.
Although the statute does, to some extent, control the conduct
of some members of the Pennsylvania bar, it has this effect not
because they are members of the bar, but because they are
former employees of an administrative agency. By choosing to
accept or continue employment with the Public Utility Commission after January 1, 1979, an employee of the Commission voluntarily subjects himself to a one-year ban on representation
before the Commission. The restriction is a control not over attorneys, but over employees of the Commission, and its primary
effect is on the Commission, not on the Pennsylvania bar.'
80. Id
81. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon 1979).
82. This reasoning would be applicable to attorneys employed by any administrative agency established by the legislature and, in fact, to employees of
any "governmental body" outside of the judicial branch.
83. The commonwealth court specifically rejected the claim that section
3(e) was not a regulation of the practice of law, but rather a condition of
employment with the state:
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Therefore, even though the statute, if applied to attorneys
employed by administrative agencies, controls the conduct of
some attorneys, the supreme court should allow it to stand. The
restriction serves a valid legislative purpose, only incidentally affects the conduct of some attorneys, and has virtually no effect
on the state judicial system.
B.

Financial Disclosure Requirements

The reasoning used by the commonwealth court in deciding
two recent cases illustrates the differences between the functional approach suggested herein and the position of the Pennsylvania courts. In Ballou v. State Ethics Commission,84 the
court, following the supreme court's analysis in Wajert, held that
the financial disclosure requirements of the State Ethics Act
could not constitutionally be applied to an attorney serving as a
part-time township solicitor. Citing Disciplinary Rule 5-101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits an attorney
from accepting employment if his judgment may be affected by
his own financial interest, "except with the consent of his client
after full disclosure," 5 the court determined that "the subject of
conflict of interest including disclosure of financial interest, has

Initially, we observe that Respondents have not shown us that the pertinent statutory provision is a condition of employment. Certainly the
Ethics Act itself contains no language to that effect nor has there been
any reference to the terms of any individual contract reciting such terms.
More importantly, our case law is that a public employer may not achieve
a result through an employment contract which could not be achieved
directly as a legislative or executive function. Sweet v. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 358, 316 A.2d 665, rev'd
on other grounds, 457 Pa. 456, 322 A.2d 362 (1974) and Beckert v.
AFSCME, District Council 88, 425 A.2d 859 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). Since
we have already held that Section 3(e) is an impermissible incursion of the
legislature into an exclusively judicial function it must follow that the
legislature cannot, by labeling Section 3(e) a condition of employment
breathe validity into an otherwise invalid legislative effort.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n Bar Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d 1327,
1331-32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
84. 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 424 A.2d 983, affd on other grounds, 436 A.2d
186 (Pa. 1981).
85. DR 5-101(A) provides that: "Except with the consent of his client after
full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected
by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests."
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been fully regulated with respect to attorneys by the Supreme
Court." 8
Judge Craig, in dissent, recognized that there was absolutely
no inconsistency between the disciplinary code and the financial
disclosure requirements of the Act:
The financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act do not
conflict with the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which require attorneys to declare and eschew conflicts of
interest. The financial disclosure provisions of the statute implement the canons of ethics in a consistent way. Public disclosure of
solicitors' interests would serve to inform the public, who have
the right to know when bias might sway a solicitor's official advice, the importance of which has been rightly recognized in the
majority opinion here."
In the Wajert case there were specific supreme court rules8 8
restricting the practice of law by former judges and public officials. It was at least arguable that the specific restrictions involved a conscious decision that all other legal employment by
these former officials should be allowed. The Disciplinary Rules,
however, contain no requirement specifically directed at
disclosure of financial interests by attorneys who are public officials. Judge Craig is correct in his determination that a law
providing for public disclosure of financial interests by public
employees is not inconsistent with a disciplinary rule requiring
disclosure to a client of any conflicting financial interest.
Moreover, the limited disclosure requirements of Disciplinary
Rule 5-101 do not give rise to the implication that further
disclosure can never be required of an attorney by a client as a
condition of the attorney's employment. The Ethics Act
disclosure requirement is not a restriction on the practice of law;
it is a requirement by a client, the state, that to be employed as
its representative, an attorney must disclose certain financial information to the client. If the attorney does not wish to fulfill the
client's requirement, he is still free to practice law before any
court or agency on behalf of any other client; he must merely
forego employment with that client.
86. 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 248, 424 A.2d at 987.
87. Id. at 249, 424 A.2d at 987 (Craig, J., dissenting).
88. DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(B). See note.33 and accompanying text supra,
and note 63 supra.
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Thus, the financial disclosure requirement of the Ethics Act
does not violate and appears, in fact, to be consistent with
supreme court rules. 9 As Judge Craig recognized, the last
sentence of article V, section 10(c) of the constitution "makes
clear that legislation relating to municipal solicitors, as part of
the class of public officials, is not barred except as it may conflict
with judicial rules of legal ethics."9 Therefore, "until the
Supreme Court makes express provision for financial disclosure
by solicitors, the Ethics Act disclosure requirement is not inconsistent and therefore is not ousted by the governing provision of
' 91
the constitution.
Neither should the Act's financial disclosure requirement be
ousted as having a harmful effect on the administration of justice
in Pennsylvania. The additional requirement imposed on former
judges in Wajert raised the possibility of lower quality judges
sitting on the bench.92 Any detrimental effect resulting from the
imposition of a financial disclosure requirement on township
solicitors will be suffered, if at all, by townships, who may find it
difficult to attract qualified solicitors. The negative effect will be
on township administration, not on the administration of justice
and hence is not a proper consideration for the court.93
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided
Ballou on appeal,9 ' the court avoided the constitutional question
discussed in this article. The supreme court held that a part-time
township solicitor is not a "public employee" as defined by the
Ethics Act, and was therefore not required under the Act to file

89. One potential inconsistency arises where the financial disclosure requirements force an attorney to reveal "a confidence or secret of his client, including his identity." DR 4-101(B)(1). See note 60 supra. The Ethics Act requirement that each financial statement contain "[tihe name and address of any person who is the direct or indirect source of income totalling in the aggregate
$500 or more," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 405(b)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981), might require disclosure of clients' identities. The legislature, cognizant of the problem,
qualified the requirement with a proviso to circumvent the inconsistency:
"However, this provision shall not be construed to require the divulgence of
confidential information protected by statute or existing professional codes of
ethics." Id
90. 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 248, 424 A.2d at 987 (Craig, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 249, 424 A.2d at 988 (Craig, J., dissenting).
92. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
94. Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 436 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1981).
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a financial disclosure statement.95 The constitutional issue will
not disappear, however, because elected officials, such as district
attorneys and attorneys employed full-time by state administrative agencies, would still appear to be covered by the
Act."
In Kremer v. State Ethics Commissiol 97 a companion case to
Ballou, the question addressed by the commonwealth court was
whether the same financial disclosure requirements of the Ethics
Act could be imposed on judges. In this situation, as in Ballou,
there is no inconsistency between the statute and the supreme
court rules. Contrary to the Ballou result, however, an examination under the Kremer facts of the effect of the statute on the
administration of justice may result in a determination that the
statute has a detrimental effect. A showing that the financial
disclosure requirements discourage qualified candidates from serving as judges98 and that this negative effect outweighs the
benefits flowing from financial disclosure might be sufficient to
justify striking down the statute as applied to judges.
95. The Ethics Act defines a public employee as "[any individual employed
by the Commonwealth or a political subdivision who is responsible for taking or
recommending official action of a nonministerial nature .... ." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 65, § 402 (Purdon Supp. 1981). The supreme court held that "a municipal
solicitor, functioning as a legal adviser to the appointing body, closely
resembles a consultant who, as defined in the Ethics Act, 'performs professional, scientific, technical or advisory services. . . . [and] receives a fee,
honorarium or similar compensation for such service.'" 436 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa.
1981).
96. The supreme court specifically declined to decide this question,
however: "Our decision is limited to the application of the Ethics Act to attorneys serving in appellee's capacities. Not presented on this record is the application of the act to any others serving in the public sector as attorneys." 436
A.2d at 187 n.3.
97. 56 Pa. Commw. Ct. 160, 424 A.2d 968 (1981), appeal docketed, Nos.
81-3-408 and 81-3-409 (Pa. May 22, 1981).
98. Unlike stringent post-employment restrictions, which are generally
acknowledged to have some negative effect on recruitment of public officials,
see notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra, there is no agreement'among experts in the field about whether financial disclosure requirements have such an
effect. "[S]ome people, particularly those with substantial business or industry
ties or with substantial industrial investments, may be unwilling to seek public
employment or appointment to higher public office." VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OFINTEREST, supra note 33, at 53. But see Terapak, supra note 14, at 82-83:
From the beginning it was feared that financial disclosure might
dampen the enthusiasm of those who might otherwise seek office or public
service ....
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RECONCILING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WITH
PRESENT PENNSYLVANIA LAW

A functional approach to evaluating legislation that falls
within the area of overlap of legislative and judicial power has
been adopted by the supreme courts of several states. In Sadler
v. Oregon State Bar99 the Oregon Supreme Court, pursuant to
the Inspection of Public Records Law,' 0 allowed inspection of
records of disciplinary proceedings against an attorney, even
though the applicable disciplinary rules provided that such
records were to be made public only after a formal complaint had
been filed by the state bar association.'" Recognizing that this
statute fell into the area of "overlap of judicial and legislative
powers, ' 02 the court determined that the proper question before
it was whether the statute "is an unreasonable encroachment on
the judicial function of disciplining attorneys." ' 3 Deciding that
public disclosure of complaints against attorneys would improve
public confidence in the bar and that "[t]o strike down the Public
Records Law would give special treatment to attorneys and
perhaps encourage public belief that a veil of secrecy is hiding
professional misconduct,"'0 4 the court allowed the law to stand.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a similar
position in upholding application of the Massachusetts public official financial disclosure law to attorneys and court employees: 0
While we recognize the importance of observing scrupulously the
division of powers of each branch of government, we are also
cognizant of the need for some flexibility in the allocations of
functions among the three departments. Each branch, to some exOhio statistics indicate no precipitous significant or even recognizable
drop in the "post-74" period. In fact, election officials indicate that there
has been an increase in the number of candidates at the state and county
levels in the past few years ....
Likewise, there have been no mass resignations by appointed public officials due to financial disclosure.
Id,
99.
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
(1978).

275 Or. 279, 550 P.2d 1218 (1976).
OR.

REV. STAT.

275 Or. at
Id at 285,
Id at 293,
Id. at 295,
Opinion of

§§ 192.410-.500 (1973).

283, 550 P.2d at 1220-21.
550 P.2d at 1222.
550 P.2d at 1226.
550 P.2d at 1227.
the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 795, 376 N.E.2d 810
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tent, exercises executive, legislative and judicial powers. The
critical inquiry here is whether the requirements which the proposed law would impose on attorneys and employees and officials
of the judicial department would interfere with the functions of
that branch of government."' 6
There is some support in Pennsylvania case law for application
of a functional approach when judicial and legislative areas of
responsibility overlap. The clearest examples involve fiscal control of the judiciary, 17 probably because it is difficult for the
supreme court to deny that the function of allocating public
monies to public agencies, including the courts, is a legitimate
legislative function. Although the court has not lost sight of the
fact that control over the purse strings can mean control over all
aspects of the judicial system, it has not claimed the exclusive
power to appropriate and allocate funds for the judicial department.
The rule that has developed in this area is that the provision
of funds for all government agencies is ordinarily left to the
legislature. Although the judiciary possesses "the inherent
power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money
which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated
responsibilities,"'0 8 such power is not to be exercised unless the
legislature neglects or refuses "to furnish funds, or sufficient
funds, for reasonable judicial functions, and in consequence the
efficient administration of the judicial branch of the government
is thereby impaired or destroyed. ' .9
The same approach is taken in the area of setting salary levels
for judges. Primary responsibility is allocated to the legislature,
to be set aside by the supreme court only if salaries fall below a
level which impairs the operation of the judiciary.1
Another Pennsylvania case recognized, as Wajert did not, that

106. Id. at 813, 376 N.E.2d at 822.
107. See notes 108-10 and accompanying text infra.
108. Carrol v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971). Accord, Leahey
v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
109. 442 Pa. at 54, 274 A.2d at 198.
110. In Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972), the court stated:
The only limitation on the legislative authority to ... [set judicial compensation]-and that only arises by implication from the tripartite nature of
our government and the importance of maintaining the independence of
each of the three branches of government-is that such judicial compensa-
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there might be an area of overlap of legislative and judicial
power, but resolved the issue in favor of the judiciary without
use of the functional analysis described herein. In In re 42 Pa. C.
S. § 1703,111 the supreme court held the Public Agency Open
Meeting Law" 2 inapplicable to the supreme court's rulemaking
deliberations,1 3 explicitly refusing to examine the effect of such a
law on the judicial process: "the practical immediate effect of
Section 1703 is far less important than the principle of the
separation of powers and the policies that it represents." 4
If the supreme court continues to apply the reasoning used in
Wajert, the court will likely agree with the commonwealth
court's holdings in Ballou and Kremer and find the financial
disclosure requirements of the Ethics Act unconstitutional as applied to judges and attorneys. This reasoning will probably also
lead it to strike down application of the post-employment restriction of the Act to all former government attorneys.'1 5
There are, however, a few encouraging signs that this continued assault on the Ethics Act is not the only possible scenario.
Three factors permit the court the opportunity to uphold portions of the statute without reversing its Wajert holding: (1) the
supreme court's refusal to decide whether Wajert should be extended to other attorneys; (2) Judge Craig's insightful dissents in
Ballou and Kremer; and (3) the factual distinctions in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Association v. Thornburgh.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Members of ethics commissions in other states,"' as well as attorneys in those states whose conduct is regulated by governmental ethics laws, are no doubt watching the Pennsylvania
tion be adequate to insure the proper functioning of the judicial system in
an unfettered and independent manner.
Id. at 83-84, 288 A.2d at 815. Accord, Kremer v. Barbieri, 490 Pa. 444, 417 A.2d
121 (1980).
111. 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444 (1978).
112. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1703 (Purdon 1981).
113. 482 Pa. at 534, 394 A.2d at 451.
114. Id. at 532, 394 A.2d at 450.
115. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n Bar Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d
1327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
116. 3 Council on Governmental Ethics Laws, March, 1981, at 2.
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courts with interest. Judge Wajert's successful challenge to the
Pennsylvania Ethics Act will certainly spawn similar challenges
in other states.
The supreme courts of other states should follow the lead of
Massachusetts and Oregon, rather than Pennsylvania, and take a
more flexible, functional, and restrained approach to this area of
overlap of judicial and legislative powers.
Most state supreme courts have the constitutional power to
control the conduct of the state bench and bar; also, most state
legislatures have the constitutional power to govern the ethics of
state public officials. Because some public officials are also attorneys and judges, passage of a state ethics act will necessarily
involve some legislative regulation in an area of supreme court
control. The validity of the legislation turns on whether the
statutes are viewed as a usurpation of supreme court power, or
as a proper legislative concern in an area of overlap of judicial
and legislative power.
The Pennsylvania courts have adopted the former position,
striking down portions of the State Ethics Act as applied to attorneys and judges without examining the practical effects which
result from an application of the statute.
This article has proposed an alternative, functional approach
to the problem. The functional approach is based on the premise
that control over the ethical conduct of public officials who are
also attorneys or judges is a matter of concern for both the
judicial and the legislative branches. In examining the application of state ethics laws to members of the bench and the bar,
the state supreme court should determine whether the statute is
inconsistent with supreme court rules for governance of the bar
or whether the statute has a deleterious effect on the state
judicial system. If the answer to either of these questions is
affirmative, the court should hold the statute unconstitutional as
applied to attorneys or judges or both; otherwise, the statute
should be allowed to stand. The functional approach gives the
court the final word on matters relating to the conduct of the
bar, but does not needlessly interfere with proper legislative
control over the conduct of public officials.

